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Governing Security at the 2008 Beijing Olympics
Ying Yu, Francisco Klauser and Gerald Chan
As sports mega-events (SMEs) attract growing worldwide attention, the security aspect of
these events has assumed greater global importance, especially in the post-9/11 anti-
terrorism context. The 2008 Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX
Olympiad set security concern as a top priority. This paper analyses the empirical data
derived from fieldwork in Beijing in early 2008 as well as information gathered from
official documents and media articles. It presents the types of forces and agencies which
shaped the Olympic security plan and explains how the Chinese government integrated
its preventive, engaging and repressive strategies. The paper advances a number of
preliminary arguments in connection with four main developments at work within the
current dynamics of security governance at SMEs: the globalization, technologization,
commercialization and standardization of SMEs’ securitization.
Introduction
Sports mega-events (SMEs) such as the Olympic Games not only generate immense
economic and socio-cultural opportunities for host cities and nations but also evoke
local, national and international security concerns. Since 9/11 and the invasion of
Iraq, the risk of terrorism has greatly intensified the security dimension of SMEs.
Security expenditure for the 2004 Athens Olympics amounted to US$1.5 billion,
more than double that for the 2000 Sydney games. [1] The projected security bill
for the 2008 Beijing games – although not officially revealed by the Chinese
Government – is widely believed to have topped the amount spent in Athens. [2] It
thus seems almost inevitable that the Beijing Olympics would be seen as ‘the largest
peacetime security operation in history’. The massive cost in security matters at SMEs
is admittedly justified by the need to provide safe and risk-free games not only for the
athletes but also for international visitors and the local population.
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Drawing on information gathered from field interviews, official documents and
media articles, both in English and in Chinese, this paper analyses the multiple
security partnerships and strategies associated with the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.
With respect to the problematic of security governance at SMEs more generally, we
shall advance a number of preliminary arguments in connection with four main
developments at work within the current dynamics of security governance at SMEs:
the globalization, technologization, commercialization and standardization of SMEs’
securitization.
In order to address these issues, the Beijing case-study has special appeal for several
reasons. First, recent political and socio-economic changes in China’s position within
the global, neo-liberal economic system raise important issues about both China’s
general role and responsibility within international security politics and about
China’s involvement in the joint, international securitization of SMEs more
particularly. Second, China’s specific socio-economical characteristics present a
strong challenge for the involvement of traditionally Western dominated actor-
networks in SME-security matters, making it particularly relevant to study the
relationships between the various actors involved in the securitization of the Beijing
games. Third, current debates about minority rights and human rights in China raise
a number of acute ethical issues linked to the employment of large-scale high-tech
security and surveillance strategies which call for critical investigation.
Our investigation is situated in the intersection of three growing – yet largely
unconnected – domains of theoretical and empirical research. First, a growing body
of research has in recent years sought to investigate the problems and opportunities
associated with the organization and staging of SMEs. In this field, two types of
studies can be distinguished: one tends to be focused on the economic value of SMEs
in terms of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’, [3] promoting cities’ and nations’ tourist
image, [4] facilitating urban transformations, attracting financial investments and
thus producing economic developments. [5] The other genre tends to be more
interpretative and qualitative, referring to the ‘sociology and politics of mega-events’.
[6] While both of these genres offer important insights into the roles of SMEs as
catalysts for promoting socio-economic, urban, political or cultural outputs, little
critical attention has been paid to the causes and effects of the wide-ranging security
issues at SMEs. Second, a substantial international body of research has been focusing
especially on the problems of sport-related social risks, emphasizing the threat of
‘crowd violence’ and hooliganism. [7] Yet this research field has not produced a
systematic, comparative body of analysis of SME security issues (including counter-
terrorism) with reference to themes of urban development or post-SME social
‘legacies’. Third, this paper draws on the increasingly sophisticated body of
theoretical and empirical research about the shifting modes of global security
governance in general, [8] and about the question of how contemporary security
practices in the war on terror impact upon everyday (urban) life in particular. [9]
There is, however, a major research lacuna in this body of literature regarding the
question of how the exceptional circumstances of mega-events – as specific ‘moments
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and places at risk’ – act as a catalyst in the ‘making’ of urban-centred security
governance.
Despite the growing importance of security issues at SMEs, very few academic
works have provided critical accounts of the wider social implications of the massive
security efforts surrounding SMEs. Addressing this important gap of research, our
paper provides an opportunity to complement and extend the existing literature on
mega-events through its explicit focus on risk, security and surveillance at the 2008
Beijing Olympics. We divide our paper into four main parts: (1) the spatialities; (2)
the actor-networks; (3) the security strategies; and (4) the implications of the security
agenda at the 2008 Beijing games.
Climate of Insecurity
Before we investigate the spatialities, partnerships and arrangements in security
governance at the Beijing Olympics, it is important to provide a context of the
prevailing ‘climate of insecurity’ in which security measures were being legitimized.
We explore this issue by engaging with the risk discourses propagated by the Chinese
media in the run-up to the games.
In the months leading up to the 2008 Olympics, the Chinese media reported at
length a wide range of threatening forces to the games, three of which stand out. First,
media articles focused on various forms of criminality – both indigenous and foreign
originated – ranging from petty crimes, frauds, rapes and kidnappings to
internationally organized crimes and people trafficking (prostitution and labour).
Stressing the city’s high population density and diversity, as well as the games-
induced influx of immigrants, resources and business opportunities, Beijing was seen
to present higher crime rates, higher rates of floating delinquents and higher levels of
professional criminals than previous Olympic sites. [10]
Second, and comparable to the security rhetoric at SMEs in the Western world, the
Chinese media focused on the threat of terrorism, which was described as the most
critical security issue at the games. In contrast to the almost exclusive Western
preoccupation with Al-Qaeda terrorism, however, the Chinese media reported widely
on the potential of terrorist attacks by Chinese ethnic minorities and religious
groups. In this regard, ‘Xinjiang independence’ organizations were treated as the
most dangerous terrorist enemies to Olympic security. [11] Tian Yixiang, director of
the military bureau of the Security Command Centre of the games (SCC), said that
‘the main danger is a terrorist attack from three possible threats: East Turkistan
terrorists, Tibetan separatists and the evil Falun Gong cult’. [12] From March to May
2008, for example, Xinhua News reported a series of alleged sabotage and terrorist
activities by East Turkistan separatists. [13]
Third, the Chinese media repeatedly expressed strong concern about the multiple
threatening forces of the games’ sociocultural and political symbolism. Sabotage
activities of Tibetan independence organizations were not only seen to endanger the
athletes and population, but also to threaten the carefully constructed image of the
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Olympics as a symbol for China’s unity and rising power in global affairs. ‘The goal of
all Dalai Lama schemes,’ Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu was quoted in the
press as saying, ‘is to split the motherland, sabotage ethnic unity, sabotage China’s
relations with other nations and interfere with the Olympic Games.’ [14] Yet the
understanding of ‘disturbances’ as threatening forces for the games’ symbolism can
also be seen in connection with other stigmatized social groups, ranging from
complaining migrants to revolting demolition victims, from human-rights advocates
to religious petitioners, from political dissidents to environmental activists and to
international boycott forces. [15] In the press, China warned repeatedly against any
activities by organizations that tried to undermine the preparatory work of the
Olympics and made clear regulations and legal guidelines for the entry, exit and stay
of foreigners in China during the games. According to the official website of the
Beijing games, ‘unwelcome’ foreigners included
those who have been deported or prohibited from entering China by the Chinese
government; those who might commit acts of terrorism, violence or subversion
after entering China; those who might engage in smuggling, drug dealing or
prostitution after entering China; those who are suffering from mental disorders or
insanity, sexually transmitted diseases, tuberculosis or other infectious diseases;
those who cannot guarantee their ability to support themselves financially while in
China; and those who might engage in any acts that threaten the security or
interests of China. [16]
Spatialities of Security Governance at the Beijing Games
It is important to investigate the spatial dimension of the security strategies and
arrangements at the Beijing games, not only to understand how security operations
addressed different types of risks in the urban environment but also to study how
these operations gave rise to cumulative effects on public urban order.
First, security governance at the Beijing games focused on specific points within the
urban environment, corresponding both to central, interrelated nodes within the
Beijing transport networks such as airports and railway stations and to high-risk points
such as stadiums and hotels for International Olympic Committee officials. Securing
these high-risk points became one of the main concerns of Chinese police forces and
private security staff before and during the games. In this respect, it is of critical
importance to highlight the role of access control for security purposes. Aimed at
creating safe and risk-free places by controlling the flows of people and objects crossing
the borderline between the inside and the outside at specific points in space, access
control illustrates the spatial logic of security governance, which consists of selecting,
classifying, differentiating, arranging and controlling specific portions of space, without
according the same type of attention to the whole territory. Access control therefore
aims to guarantee the good functioning of separated, differentiated and hierarchically
organized parts of the urban environment, often carried to the point of complete
segregation between indoor (secured) and outdoor (unsecured) space. [17]
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By way of example, consider the security design of Beijing’s most famous Olympic
stadium, the ‘Bird’s Nest’. The stadium’s ticket gates were integrated into an oval-
shaped close security fence at a distance of approximately 20 metres from the
stadium. This security fence allowed the division of the stadium’s adjoining space
into two distinct zones: the publicly accessible check-in zone for ticket and security
checks and the inside security perimeter, leading directly to the stadium and allowing
the audience to look for platforms or to wait for exit. This inside space was not set
arbitrarily but in accordance with the needs of space per capita, measured by the size
of the venue to accommodate the audience.[18]
Second, and beyond the securitization of specific high-risk points within the urban
environment, security efforts at the games were directed predominantly towards
Beijing’s Chaoyang district, where the Olympic Green as well as 13 of the 31 Olympic
venues were located (see Figure 1). According to Beijing News, an extra 2,000 cameras,
partly equipped with face- and licence-plate-recognition software, were installed in the
Chaoyang district, covering 54.2 per cent of the district’s surface by CCTV. [19]
Third, the security arrangements at the Beijing Olympics not only covered specific
high-risk points within the urban environment such as stadiums and key buildings,
nor were they restricted exclusively to the Chaoyang district. Rather, they affected
Beijing and its population much more generally. In total, ten million people signed
and pledged to participate in Olympic security. [20] The universalizing of security
consciousness and responsibility into people’s everyday life had been achieved
gradually through mechanisms of mass mobilization, media propaganda and mass
participation such as Beijing’s ‘Olympic security law and order campaign’ launched
on 26 April 2008.
Actor Networks in Security Governance at the Beijing Games
Security governance is the product of relationships mediated by various partnerships,
intentions and domains of expertise. It is therefore useful to examine the networks of
actors involved in the setting up, development and use of the security system at the
2008 Beijing games. Instead of providing an exhaustive analysis of the whole panoply
of actions and actors engaged in the securitization of the Beijing Olympics, we place
particular emphasis on two interlinked developments: the proliferating range and
scale of multinational security collaborations; and the increasing importance of high-
tech surveillance technologies.
Security Collaborations on Local, National and International Scales
In the post-9/11 context of the ‘war on terror’, threats of political violence and
terrorism are increasingly fuelled and sustained by transnational networks that can be
global and local at the same time. [21] The interdependences of security strategies on
local, national and global scales find exemplary expression in sports mega-events as
privileged loci, where globally operating actors – moving from country to country,
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city to city, and event to event – meet with locally anchored stakeholders in security
governance. [22] From these exchanges, much broader and longer-lasting interna-
tional security collaborations often emerge. [23]
Figure 1 Spatial Distribution of Olympic Venues in Beijing
Source: Official website of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, available online at http://
en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/, accessed 26 June 2008.
1) National Stadium; 2) National Aquatics Center; 3) National Indoor Stadium; 4)
Beijing Shooting Range Hall; 5) Beijing Olympic Basketball Gymnasium; 6) Laoshan
Velodrome; 7) Shunyi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park; 8) China Agricultural University
Gymnasium; 9) Peking University Gymnasium; 10) Beijing Science and Technology
University Gymnasium; 11) Beijing University of Technology Gymnasium; 12) Beijing
Olympic Green Tennis Court.
Existing Olympic Venues in Beijing: 13) Olympic Sports Center Stadium; 14) Olympic
Sports Center Gymnasium; 15) Beijing Workers’ Stadium; 16) Beijing Workers’
Gymnasium; 17) Capital Indoor Stadium; 18) Fengtai Sports Center Softball Field; 19)
Yingdong Natatorium of National Olympic Sports Center; 20) Laoshan Mountain Bike
Course; 21) Beijing Shooting Range CTF; 22) Beijing Institute of Technology
Gymnasium; 23) Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics Gymnasium.
Temporary Olympic Venues in Beijing: 24) Fencing Hall of National Convention
Center; 25) Beijing Olympic Green Hockey Stadium; 26) Beijing Olympic Green Archery
Field; 27) Beijing Wukesong Sports Center Baseball Field; 28) Chaoyang Park Beach
Volleyball Ground; 29) Laoshan Bicycle Moto Cross (BMX) Venue; 30) Triathlon Venue;
31) Road Cycling Course.
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Beijing invited experts from 75 security agencies in 12 countries, including Greece,
Canada, USA, Germany, France, UK, Israel and Russia, to collaborate for the 2008
Olympics securitization. On a regional scale, exchanges were intensified among police
agencies in ASEAN countries China, Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, seven
countries, including China, Russia and Kazakhstan, announced a ‘Beijing Declara-
tion’ to set up communication and cooperation to fight against international
terrorism. [24] To coordinate the international efforts in the games’ securitization, an
International Police Liaison Department was established within the Security
Command Centre to coordinate interactions between embassy security officers,
police departments from other countries and international police/intelligence
organizations. [25]
Besides cooperating with international government agencies, a wide range of
military cooperation was set in place. The Chinese national army, navy and air force
participated fully in the 2008 Beijing Olympics security work, with the establishment
of a special military unit for non-traditional security threats focusing on threats of
nuclear, bio-chemical and other terrorist attacks. [26] A specialized security
department and command centre for the Olympics was established directly under
the state ministry of public security, involving over 20 related state and municipal
ministries/departments, including the military.
To uncover the relationships embedded in the securitization of the Beijing games,
and to assess how the employed security systems were subsequently planned, set up
and used, it is important not to underestimate the global alliances between
government bodies, military and police forces. The elaboration and institutionaliza-
tion of these alliances not only aimed to strengthen the exchanges within the
international community in the field of Olympic security, but also to learn from
previous experiences in the securitization of earlier mega-events. These transfers of
experiences and expertise relied on a series of mechanisms which provide an
exploratory picture of how global security partnerships were relating to, and
intervening in, the particular local circumstances of the Beijing Olympics.
First, international collaborations in the Beijing games’ securitization relied on a
series of permanent expert consortia specializing in security issues at mega-events. In
2005 the International Permanent Observatory on Security Measures During Major
Events was established, bringing together 24 foreign security experts from ten
countries and four international organizations, including the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the United Nations’ Inter Regional Crime and Justice Research
Institute and the European Police Office, in order to share their experience at earlier
events such as previous Olympic Games, the 2004 European Football Cup and the
2003 Evian G8 Summit. [27]
Second, the organization of numerous security conferences in the run-up to the
games helped the development of new international coalitions of authority and
responsibility in the securitization of the Beijing games. The organization of expert
conferences constitutes a crucial mechanism to pre-mediate future collaborations and
interactions between local, national and international security players. At the
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International Conference on Security Cooperation in 2007, for example, the
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) confirmed its assistance to
the securitization of the Beijing games. Consequently, a support team was sent to
Beijing, armed with extensive databases, including the names, images, fingerprints
and relevant DNA information of internationally known and suspected criminals.
Interpol also created an online service with China, based on the nation’s 15.7 million-
strong database of stolen, fabricated and lost travel documentation. [28]
Third, in order to learn from the experiences of previous mega-events, Chinese
security officials participated in ‘best practices’ training programmes with security
stakeholders at earlier events, receiving training in violence prevention, policing
management and information management in police colleges in Britain, Germany,
Australia and other countries. [29] In addition, 39 Chinese officers were sent to
Greece to learn from the Athens Olympic security model. [30] On the basis of these
experiences, Chinese security departments compiled a manual for security problems
that occurred in the Olympic Games since the riots in the football field in the 1964
Tokyo Olympics, studying their causes, effects and methods of control. Beijing also
established a ‘Memo of 2008 Olympic Games and Paralympics on Security
Cooperation’ with the Ministry of Hellenic Public Order in Greece. [31]
Private Companies in the Securitization of the Beijing Games
The growing international exchanges and interdependences in security governance of
SMEs are intrinsically linked to the increasingly important role played by private
providers of specialized technologies and services in security matters. Before the
games, the 2008 Olympics security department insisted heavily on the slogans
‘Technological Olympics’ and ‘Strengthening Police through Technology’. Conse-
quently, security technologies and equipment were developed substantially through
international exchange and cooperation, resulting in an elaborate high-tech security
system, praised by the International Olympic Committee as ‘very wise and farsighted,
best ever seen’. [32] As Robin Huang, chief operating officer of China’s Ministry of
Public Security has put it, ‘we have very good relationships with US companies like
IBM, Cisco, HP, and Dell . . . etc. All of these US companies are closely working with
us to build our system together’. [33] Honeywell, for example, was reported to have
set up a sophisticated computer monitoring system, enabling Chinese police to
analyse CCTV images of public places near Olympic venues for ‘suspicious’ objects
and behaviour. Other large-scale, high-tech surveillance systems were delivered by
United Technologies, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, [34]
Panasonic, Philips, JVC and Siemens.
Besides international technology providers, national and local companies also
played an active role. Tsinghua Tongfang, for example, was responsible for the Ditan
Gymnasium Olympic security project, including CCTV surveillance, alarm systems,
security access control, power supply systems, lightning protection systems and so on.
[35] Golden Vision, another Tsinghua University-based technological company,
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managed security projects such as the CCTV surveillance platform in the Tennis
Centre of the Beijing Olympic Green; [36] Nine Vatech Technology Company
equipped the Beijing Shooting Range Hall, the Basketball Gymnasium, the Water
Cube and the Bird’s Nest with remote intelligence management systems; and the
China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation applied advanced technologies such as
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in access control and the latest block-
orientated motion-compensation-based video coding (MPEG4 and H264) in CCTV
surveillance to the Olympic security system. [37]
In contrast to mega-events in Western democratic countries, Beijing’s security
strategies dwelled in a distinctive authoritarian political system, with the government
asserting strong control over the involvement of international security players. On
the one hand, the Olympics provided an opportunity for extended collaborations
between domestic and global corporations, resulting in reinforced knowledge
transfers in security/surveillance matters with the West. On the other, Western
security companies could potentially compromise the Chinese state control of
security.
Consequently, the Chinese government attempted to formally regulate and
coordinate the relationships among state, public and private players in security
matters, in order to mobilize and utilize effectively its own local and national
resources and interests. A series of principles were set up by the Chinese security
department, such as rational competition, fair play, non-monopoly, transparency and
multi-management, to apply to the bidding-process, budgeting, assessment,
management and construction of security systems. [38] Since 2002, the Beijing
government had designated two newspapers (the People’s Daily and China Daily) and
two website portals (www.chinabidding.com.cn and www.bjinvest.gov.cn) as legal
media to publish bidding information on security projects, [39] to buttress a system
of government purchases and to open bidding according to the bidding law. [40]
Nevertheless, local security companies had expressed repeated concerns about
hidden, unwritten rules behind these regulations and procedures. And governmental
purchases of security technologies seemed to have been far less transparent than they
claimed to be. Commonly distorted phenomena ranged from invited bids to informal
negotiations between companies and government departments. [41]
Three Security Strategies: Preventive, Engaging, Repressive
The media-reported domestic and international security threats at the Beijing
Olympics, described earlier as a general ‘climate of insecurity’, helped to legitimize a
substantial increase of surveillance and tightened control and other ‘precautionary’
security measures. In the following sub-sections, we shall provide a reading of some
of the security approaches, based on the distinction between preventive, engaging and
repressive security strategies. On this basis, we shall then raise a series of critical
questions regarding the wider social implications of the massive security efforts, in
terms of privacy, human-rights and minority issues.
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Preventive Security Strategies
The securitization of the Beijing games relied on a wide range of preventive security
measures. Before the event, as mentioned above, surveillance and control had
increased substantially, based not only on the wide use of security technologies in
Beijing itself but also on international exchanges of databases of criminal and
terrorist suspects. Furthermore, thousands of additional security personnel had been
recruited and trained through specific exercises and training programmes.
The expert conferences and ‘best practices’ programmes discussed earlier not only
served to institutionalize the practices and relationships underlying the securitization
of the event itself; they also provided a space of experimentation to adjust and
rehearse the uses of the newly installed high-tech security systems. The ‘Good Luck
Beijing’ test-event, for example, brought together actors from every level of the
games’ securitization, from Chinese police forces to civilian volunteers, from
international anti-terrorism experts to local military forces, from relevant govern-
ment departments to representatives of security companies.
Engaging Security Strategies
An important feature of the games’ preventive security plan lies in its all-inclusiveness at
the population level. Aimed at mobilizing a huge security network throughout Beijing,
Chinese authorities sought to embody four actor networks in their security planning: a
patrol network; a public security network; a state institution network; and a community
network. [42] In the local community network, a command department was established,
led by the Politics and Law Committee of the municipal party committee, to engage all
units and institutions to work on their locality. [43] Beijing deepened grassroots security
operations by promoting education on public safety and crime prevention, inciting
social groups and the general public to watch their neighbourhoods, care for their home
and do everything they could to participate in the Olympic Games security work. [44]
According to government rhetoric, to prevent major crime and potential terrorist
attacks a harmonious social environment had to be created, in which no criminals
could thrive. Based on a ‘zero tolerance’ strategy, the objective was to create a ‘clean’
urban environment in order to ensure a secure and terrorist-free Olympic event. [45]
The Chinese security ministry characterized this approach as a ‘sand-pile effect’,
meaning that the fight against petty crimes and minor problems of disorder, as the basis
of the sand pile, would help to reduce major threats of criminal and terrorist activities,
i.e. the peak of the pile. [46] Consequently, the Olympic security work was framed in a
way as to deal with crime prevention and control in Beijing at the grassroots level. [47]
Repressive Security Strategies
The preventive and engaging aspects of Beijing’s security approach were clearly linked
to the repression of unwanted ‘elements’ considered to threaten Beijing’s harmonious
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urban environment and to endanger the games’ smooth running. At this level,
critically questioning the wider social implications of the massive security efforts is
in order.
Before the games, important efforts were made to remove people and to ban
activities that did not tie in with the desired harmonious image of the Chinese capital.
[48] Chinese security agencies stepped up detentions of political dissidents and the
surveillance of political activists. Human Rights Watch has extensively documented
the abuses and detention of human-rights lawyers and a pattern of interference and
political control of dissidents, especially in cases viewed as ‘politically sensitive’ by the
authorities. [49] Moreover, the authorities had tightened upmedia access to social and
labour activists and other considered ‘troublemakers’. [50] The central government
put pressure on local officials by assessing their job performance on the basis of the
number of petitioners who were allowed to make their way to Beijing. Thus the
holding up of petitioners by local governments was not uncommon. [51] Such
repressive strategy was also applied to normal criminal cases in the ongoing ‘strike
hard’ campaign against crimes, as programmed in the so-called ‘Action for a Safe
Olympics’. [52] From January to May 2008, Beijing police forces beefed up security for
the Olympics by cracking down on organized crimes, robbery, murder and other
severe criminal offences, confiscating illegally held explosives, guns and ammunition,
and strengthening control over knives, bows and crossbows. They also stepped up
surveillance on entertainment venues to fight pornography and gambling. [53]
In the Chinese media, the repression of unwanted individuals and social groups
remained largely unquestioned in terms of its efficiency, proportionality and
problematic human-rights implications. According to the Xinhua News Agency,
Beijing police had markedly improved their ability to fight crimes because of the
intensive and comprehensive Olympic security plan. [54]
Conclusion and Implications
In this paper, we have drawn on a wide range of media reports and documents to
discuss the risks and security partnerships as well as the security and surveillance
strategies at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. We have emphasized the importance of
public-private, multinational security collaborations and high-tech security measures,
as the basis of the games’ securitization. The paper thus provides a powerful picture
of the processes at work within local, national and international exchanges and
interdependences in the co-production of security governance, which connects neatly
with the growing interdisciplinary literature about the shifting modes of governance
and authority in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
Our analysis suggests a series of further investigations into the roles and wider
social implications of sports mega-events, as key moments and as key locations, in the
global production and circulation of security- and surveillance-related practices and
expertise. First, there is a crucial need to further investigate the increasing importance
of private actors and commercial goals within current developments of security
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governance, a process that is powerfully reiterated by the example of sports mega-
events’ securitization. In the current context of the war on terror, private
responsibilities in surveillance matters have become all the more important, since
Western companies play an increasingly important role worldwide in providing
standardized, technologically-based solutions in matters of public safety and counter-
terrorism policies, which have traditionally been the exclusive domain of state actors.
This process has been intensified by the ever-increasing employment of various more
or less disconnected, semi-coordinated and heterogeneous forms and technologies of
surveillance within contemporary security strategies. [55]
Implications of this development are related to the question of how the increasing
weight and scale of private authority in matters of public safety – i.e. the growing
functional fragmentation of authority in contemporary security governance – might
in fact change the very ways of dealing with contemporary security issues. In
particular, we have in mind the technical competences required to manage the
growing complexity of high-tech surveillance systems, which are likely to give
specialized private companies more weight.
There is a general need to critically discuss the role and responsibility of private
companies in dealing with current security issues not only in ‘extreme’ cases (such as
mega-events like the Beijing games) but on a more general basis. It behoves private
business companies to guarantee ethical standards in the use of security/surveillance
technology and to avoid specific events being used as a catalyst for the repression of
peaceful dissent in the name of stability. The current growth of advanced surveillance
technology not only paves the way to a better future but also leads to unprecedented
and nearly limitless possibilities of surveillance, whose original, positive intentions
can easily be twisted to serve other purposes, especially in a context of major human-
rights concerns. [56]
Second, our study of the securitization of the Beijing Olympics – as the locus for
local-national-global security collaborations – points towards a series of important
‘issues of scale’, which might guide future empirical investigations into the
interactions and interdependences between global, regional and local security
partnerships. While the given examples provide ample evidence of the significance of
the national and transnational public-private networks of competences and
responsibility in security governance at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, there is a
pressing need to better understand the precise manner in which the globally
calibrated knowledge and practices of security merge (in consensus and conflict)
within a particular milieu, and the ramifications this might have. Or, to put it as a
question: What can mega-events tell us about the interactions between security issues
on different – local, regional and global – scales? How do global security partnerships
relate to and intervene in particular local circumstances?
Third, there is a pressing need for further empirical investigations into the long-
term effects of the massive security efforts surrounding the organization and staging
of mega-events. In this respect, a major issue will be whether, and how, the
engaged security measures will continue to impose themselves within the host cities
12
of mega-events. In regard to the Beijing Olympics, it will be of particular importance
to critically investigate the long-term effects of the increased possibilities of knowing,
tracking, data-mining and profiling of specific individuals and social groups. How
will the security technologies employed at the Olympics be used after the event? In
what ways will these technologies (positively and negatively) affect the everyday life of
the residents, ethnic and religious minorities, and political dissidents in Beijing?
When the emotions evoked by the event itself have subsided, these questions should
be addressed calmly, by considering the wide range of social costs and benefits
associated with the trends of security politics shown above.
In view of the approaching 2012 London Olympics, it will be crucially important
to undertake detailed empirical investigations into these issues, in order to assess the
causes, modalities and long-term consequences of security and surveillance
operations for high-risk mega-events.
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